The Tactics of Every Single EURO 2020 Team
Your ultimate guide to the formations, playing styles, and strategic nuances of EURO 2020's behemoths, underdogs, and the already-eliminated.
Group A
Italy
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3
Style: Press and possess with verticality
Manager: Roberto Mancini
We kickstart this whole thing with maybe the most refined side of the tournament from a tactical perspective. For the full breakdown, go here. The SparkNotes version is that Roberto Mancini’s Italy play an extremely vertical brand of football for an international team. Unlike most possession-based powerhouses at this level (and even on the club scene), Italy are constantly looking to break lines from a 4-3-3 that quickly morphs into a back three, with the right back tucking inside. Left winger Lorenzo Insigne will also drift into the halfspace across from right central midfielder Nicolò Barella, putting immense pressure on the center.
When you add in Manuel Locatelli’s late runs and Domenico Berardi’s ability to keep the width and drift inwards, Italy have perhaps the most incisive attack in Europe. Everything is built around trying to hit tiny gaps in opposition defensive structures and they have the passers, positional interchanges, and technical quality to make good on their intentions.
To mitigate the risk of such verticality, Italy counterpress more ferociously than anyone in the tournament — something that is complemented by a frantic high press in more settled situations. There is a huge amount of responsibility placed on individuals to close down all nearby passing options, creating a constantly changing structure that requires each player to have excellent positional awareness, energy, and angle-closing technique.
It remains to be seen whether this is sustainable and if it can cover for Jorginho and an aging back line — which will lack Giorgi Chiellini vs. Austria, at the very least — going into the knockout stages. Italy also need to be careful about how they manage their width, given left back Leonardo Spinazzola’s right-footedness and Berardi’s desire to cut inwards.
Wales
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3 (2); 3-4-3 (1)
Style: Bale-centric direct play
Manager: Ryan Giggs
Who needs all that intricacy when you can pass it to Gareth Bale and go brrr? Ok, maybe a little bit of an oversimplification of Ryan Giggs’ tactics, but the former (or is it current?) Real Madrid-man has seemingly enjoyed the hell out of his floor-raising role. Forget Bale being the one latching onto long passes, he wants to be the guy dropping off to make the delivery, taking advantage of Daniel James’ speed, the still-boisterous Aaron Ramsey, and the 6’5” frame of striker Kieffer Moore.
Bale-centrism produced enjoyable results from a sort of 4-3-3 attack in a 2-0 win over Turkey. Ramsey is a master of timing late runs and Bale being able to receive in space is bad news for the opposition — regardless if that’s off-the-shoulder or in front of a block — but Turkey also acted like they didn’t need to defend (more on that later) and the Welsh attack looked staler vs. Switzerland and Italy.
Wales lack an organized system to break down compact teams and look a little too reliant on direct play and counter-attacks. However, Giggs does seem to have some tricks up his sleeve, going to a back five vs. Italy and deploying a curious 5-1-4 shape.
It didn’t really stop Mancini’s heavily-rotated outfit, but watch out for the reappearance of a funky scheme if Wales get past Denmark and make a date with one of the big boys.
Switzerland
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-4-1-2
Style: Budget Italy
Manager: Vladimir Petković
Switzerland come off as a sort of poor man’s Italy. A triplet of Xherdan Shaqiri, Breel Embolo, and Haris Seferović contains a nice mix of fluidity, quality between the lines, and runs into depth. Granit Xhaka is Switzerland’s metronome and is tasked with finding the talented attackers ahead of him, with Remo Freuler playing a secondary role in the double pivot. The likes of Manuel Akanji have impressed distributing out from the back and Fabian Schär has the capability to step into midfield in order to throw a wrench into opposing presses, particularly off of goal kicks.
When it all comes together, Switzerland can do some very nice things. Embolo has been very fun with his ability to receive and turn from deeper areas and the nicely-spaced attack facilitates rapid wing combinations and wall passes to take advantage of third man runs or Seferović bursting forward.
Petković also has more to offer if the situation calls for it. Against Turkey, he did something pretty cool by playing left back Ricardo Rodríguez as an LCB and Steven Zuber as a nominal LWB.
In possession, it looked far more like a regular back four; Rodríguez pushed wide and Zuber came inside, completely overloading their opponent’s midfield and allowing for easy progression through the middle. Turkey had no idea how to track Zuber all game and the new entry into the lineup assisted all three of Switzerland’s goals after drifting towards play from the left.
The problem for Switzerland is that they won’t have much of the ball vs. the favorites and their defense leaves much to be desired. They have a preference for pressing aggressively from their offensive shape, allowing for numerical equality against back threes and a man on a deeper midfielder against back fours, but the two in midfield leaves the Swiss dangerously open in the center.
Turkey
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 4-3-3
Style: Being bad
Manager: Şenol Güneş
To be honest, it’s kind of hard to figure out what exactly Turkey were trying to do throughout this whole championship. A pre-competition dark horse for many, The Crescent-Stars played with desperation and energy but showed little of the organization needed to go far in a tournament like this. After their loss to Italy, where they displayed no offensive ambition and suffered continuously in their own defensive third, Turkey went to the other end of the spectrum, loosening all the shackles.
There was potential for some nice offensive things thanks to Cengiz Ünder's mazy runs from the right and Hakan Çalhanoğlu’s ability to dictate things on the other flank, but their frenetic pace and lack of collective movements limited them. Turkey’s approach also led to an end-to-end environment that mostly benefitted their rivals, with their match vs. Wales resembling a 2011 Premier League encounter between two mid-table sides.
Perhaps a good defense might’ve saved them, as unsophisticated attacking mechanisms are hardly a rarity in international football. Alas, Turkey were one of the worst sides in EURO 2020 in this regard, demonstrating comically bad defensive compactness and discipline from a 4-4-2 mid-block.
Group B
Belgium
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-4-3
Style: Lukaku and inshallah
Manager: Roberto Martínez
Speaking of a lack of sophisticated attacking mechanisms…
Belgium’s entire offense is built around force-feeding Romelu Lukaku. If they can’t find the easy vertical pass from deep, the Red Devils will circulate wide and seek to zip balls back into one of the inside forwards, who will then hope to connect with the waiting Inter striker. If that isn’t on, a switch and a cross is the bailout, rounding out a ball-playing package that can look quite slow and uninspiring against low blocks for long stretches.
Belgium also don’t seem to be all that capable against pressure, as they were completely dominated by the ultra-aggressive Danes for an entire half of football. Center-back Jason Denayer was a massive liability on the day and Belgium struggled to open up passing lanes and securely move upfield. They simply fired difficult-to-handle balls into a dropping wide forward and lived with the results.
None of this is exactly new — Belgium simply got around it by having a fit and firing Eden Hazard and Kevin De Bruyne in the past. Unfortunately for Martínez, the former name is a shell of his old self and De Bruyne only started in the final group stage game.
Nevertheless, the Manchester City maestro has made a huge impact on limited minutes and Belgium are a team that is optimized for counter-attacking rather than controlling possession. That should theoretically match up well vs. some of the other contenders (if they can play out of a press, that is), though the way their 5-3-2/5-2-3 mid-block was exploited by Denmark was troubling.
Denmark
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-4-3 (2); 4-3-3 (1)
Style: High-pressing, direct football
Manager: Kasper Hjulmand
It’s still hard to define exactly who Denmark are from a tactical perspective in EURO 2020. Three games is hardly an adequate sample size in the best of circumstances, but we have even less to go on in regard to the Danish Dynamite for obvious reasons. Their loss to Finland is close to irrelevant for analysis given the tragic heart attack that Christian Eriksen suffered, which cut the game short before UEFA essentially forced a deeply-traumatized group to resume play later that night.
Against Belgium, Hjulmand switched from a 4-3-3 to a 3-4-3 formation, utilizing Yussuf Poulsen centrally instead of on the right. Mikkel Damsgaard replaced Jonas Wind, who flanked Poulsen with Martin Braithwaite to form a dynamic, hard-working trio that pressed the life out of Jan Vertonghen, Denayer, and Toby Alderweireld man-to-man. The front three also showed their capability to spearhead a direct and speedy style of football. Damsgaard and Braithwaite constantly dropped to overload Belgium’s midfield and the Barcelona man caused mayhem with his ability to play flick-ons into runners, winning 3 aerial duels on the night.
In truth, Hjulmand’s tactics and the Dane’s motivation slaughtered Belgium, but individual quality often trumps all.
Thus, it isn’t an exaggeration to say that Denmark were the unluckiest side in the competition going into their contest vs. Russia, where Hjulmand came up with another tactical wrinkle; Andreas Christensen stepped into midfield in build-up situations, thereby establishing a back two/four as RWB Daniel Wass dropped.
I’m not sure it completely bamboozled their rivals but it was very cool and an interesting way of trying to overload a deep defensive structure while maintaining the option to defend transitions with three center-backs. Absolutely something to watch out for in the knockout rounds.
Finland
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 5-3-2
Style: Survive
Manager: Markku Kanerva
There honestly isn’t that much to say about Finland. They’re a classic a minnow that did what they could with what they had, defending in a 5-3-2 low block that sought to make opposition progression and chance creation as difficult as possible before countering with long balls aimed at Teemu Pukki.
Their match vs. Russia gave us a window into what they’d do with more possession. Finland remained unsurprisingly direct, though they tried to facilitate some wing combinations through left interior Glen Kamara and sought to create more numbers in attack by having Robin Lod push up on the right. Ultimately, they didn’t quite have the quality nor familiarity on the front foot to make it work.
Russia
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 3-4-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: Pump it long to Dzyuba
Manager: Stanislav Cherchesov
Russia initially tried to buck the back three/five trend by going with a 4-2-3-1 against Belgium. The creatively nicknamed “The National Team” defended in a classic 4-4-2 structure, trying to contain Belgium’s double pivot with one of their own before countering if they could. In possession, the wingers would stretch high and to the touchline as Artem Dzyuba battled for long balls and tried to play in his wide teammates or feed the ball to Aleksandr Golovin. On goal kicks, all four attackers would pack to one side of the pitch in order to win second balls.
The game vs. Denmark saw a change to a 3-4-3, but the tactics largely remained the same — punt it long to Dzyuba. Against Finland, Russia had more of the ball and tried to be a little more deliberate in their build-up. It wasn’t great. The Russians regularly misplaced passes out to their wide CB’s and looked uncomfortable trying to construct organized attacks. If they couldn’t get the ball into Golovin, who tried to dribble his team into good positions, Russia were entirely reliant on Dzyuba.
Group C
Netherlands
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-5-2/3-4-1-2
Style: Piss everyone off while topping the group
Manager: Frank de Boer
Everyone’s favorite coach Frank de Boer surprised many by switching to a back three/five for the EUROs, playing Wout Weghorst up top next to Memphis Depay and going for a Marten de Roon-Frenkie de Jong-Georginio Wijnaldum midfield. There were some odd features in it for sure, such as de Roon’s insistence on dropping to generate a totally redundant back four, but it wiped the floor with mediocre opposition in Ukraine, North Macedonia, and Austria.
Weghorst’s inclusion provided the Netherland’s with much-needed occupation of the defensive line, freeing up Depay to do his second-striker thing and for the now-liberated Denzel Dumfries to bomb upfield and make unexpected runs into the box.
In all this, Wijnaldum has thrived between the lines as an auxiliary attacking presence, while Daley Blind and Frenkie de Jong have done the heavy-duty progression work with their passing and carrying, respectively.
de Boer hasn’t done anything genius and some of his instructions (*cough* de Roon *cough) have been bizarre to say the least, but his formation and general lineup selection have solved key issues while getting the best out of limited on-ball figures like Dumfries.
The main worry for the Netherlands is their defense. They were absolutely carved open on the counter by *checks notes* North Macedonia, though it is worth noting that the Dutch rotated Ryan Gravenberch in for de Roon and Donyell Malen for Weghorst. Depay-Malen did little to cut out central passing lanes and Gravenberch became the anti-de Roon, bombing forward at every opportunity and leaving literally no one but the back three to deal with turnovers.
de Roon (and possibly Weghorst) stabilizes things a little more but I have serious questions about the Netherlands’ defensive transition vs. better sides and remain unconvinced by their ability to press higher-quality build-ups.
Austria
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-5-2/3-4-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: Prevent Alaba from doing what he’s good at all costs
Manager: Franco Foda
Austria have been one of the most frustrating teams of the tournament by far. Franco Foda can be infamously conservative and that trait has dominated his selections in EURO 2020. He abandoned his qualifying approach (4-2-3-1 with David Alaba as a left-winger) in favor a back three with Alaba as the centermost central defender in a back three/five vs. North Macedonia and the Netherlands.
Austria’s offense in this initial game plan was bleak. Marcel Sabitzer had to do a ton of heavy lifting, falling back from from his left forward role to aid progression and fashion some kind of threat going into the box. Against the Netherlands, Sabitzer even had to occasionally operate as a ‘six’ in order to get his side up the pitch.
Each time the approach failed, and each time Foda conceded and pushed Alaba to LCB in order to salvage a result. And, whaddaya know, Alaba ended up assisting the winner vs. North Macedonia once he could get involved in the attack.
Foda finally decided to start a match playing well in the final group stage tie vs. Ukraine. Alaba was an influential presence from the off, assisting the only goal from a corner kick and racking up 4 key passes and 81 touches (both team highs).
However, Austria did look quite un-compact in their 4-4-2 mid-block, so I remain deeply unconvinced that Foda can balance offense and defense to get the required result vs. Italy.
Ukraine
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3
Style: Good question
Manager: Andriy Shevchenko
Jeez. I’m being really hard on this group. But you would too if you had to watch Ukraine play over 4.5 hours of football. There does seem to be a kernel of coolness with Shevchenko’s set-up; Ruslan Malinovskiy (whether that be as an interior or winger) and Andriy Yarmolenko coming inside to overload the center ahead of or next to Oleksandr Zinchenko ensures solid occupation of central lanes. But Ukraine never had the precision nor balance in deeper areas to full take advantage of that presence between the lines.
Zinchenko had an unimpressive EUROs and Ukraine would counter sound theory, such as dropping the left back to create a situational back three, with bad theory, like dropping a central midfielder to form a back four (a la de Roon), ensuring that it was very difficult to take advantage of Austria’s suspect vertical compactness.
Ukraine also didn’t look that comfortable conceding control, getting dominated by the Netherlands despite defending in numbers from a 4-1-4-1 and nearly xG’ing de Boer’s men via a Yarmolenko long-distance stunner and a set-piece strike.
Ukraine have a pretty favorable draw in Sweden but it’s very hard to see them going far in this cup.
North Macedonia
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 5-3-2 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: Try your best
Manager: Igor Angelovski
North Macedonia went into their first two games as most minnows do, choosing to shut up shop in a defensive formation and hoping to nick a result on the counter. They defended at a ~respectable level given who was at their disposal and kept it simple whenever they had settled possession, trying to find their most technical player in Elif Elmas in the left halfspace and bombing their wing-backs forward to facilitate some wing combinations with striker Goran Pandev.
Against the Netherlands, Angelovski took the gloves off and went 4-2-3-1. Elmas had a little more to work with, as wingers Ivan Trichkovski and Aleksandar Trajkovski came inside and the fullbacks advanced. Angelovski really did have the right idea by trying to attract Netherlands’ midfield forward before playing in behind them and his men got a lot going in transition. Regrettably for the brave Macedonians, there can only be one winner in a track meet between Memphis Depay and Goran Pandev.
Group D
England
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: Bore opponent to death
Manager: Gareth Southgate
I don’t think the irony of England playing the slowest, most “tiki-taka” brand of football in the EUROs has been fully grasped yet, though its ability to irritate seems to have been absorbed by all. Full analysis of their play can be found here, but, in short, they seek to control proceedings through defensive possession, dutifully sticking to U-shape circulation and relying on set-pieces to bolster their offensive production.
It’s an extremely “ah, this is international football” approach that has its merits, although they really could afford to speed things up at times. Once Scotland adjusted their defensive tactics to provide better coverage on the flanks, England lacked the tempo to stress their neighbor’s midfield line of three and created very little after some early chances.
This wasn’t a problem vs. the Czech Republic, who paradoxically decided to press without much pressure, allowing England to calmly pick out an overload from the forward line. Once someone like Bukayo Saka had space to turn and run into, the pace reached a more attractive speed and England were in business.
England’s success vs. more aggressive (if you can call it that) defense bodes well for them against the likes of Italy and Spain. Unless you can manufacture tons of turnovers, you’re playing into The Three Lions’ hands by forcing them to speed it up and by opening up spaces for the likes of Sterling to run into.
Southgate is no doubt content to remain with his tactics for this reason (among others), but he has plenty of options should he want to make adjustments. Harry Kane’s incessant desire to drop to the ball has been a bad fit for this group and Jadon Sancho only saw the pitch as substitute vs. the Czechs. Dominic Calvert-Lewin sits on the bench, as do a number of quality players who make up another Golden Generation of English talent.
Croatia
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Manager: Zlatko Dalić
Style: Same thing in 2018
In many ways, Croatia are very similar to England. They’ve operated in a 4-3-3 twice and a 4-2-3-1 once and Dalić’s circulation can be painfully slow and horizontal. Going back to the World Cup days, there has been a huge responsibility on the interiors to take up almost inverted fullback spaces and manage progression from there. It worked just well enough with a Luka Modrić in the final year of his prime and a generally younger squad, but has become progressively less effective as the years have passed.
England hardly broke a sweat containing Croatia’s offense and Dalić made things worse by switching to the aforementioned 4-2-3-1 vs. the Czech Republic (possibly done because Marcelo Brozović was atrocious vs. the English). Modrić and Mateo Kovačić had even less freedom to go forward and Croatia lacked multiple threats between the lines, with Ivan Perišić starting off the first half on the right wing.
Second period changes moved Perišić to the opposite flank, salvaged the result, and probably convinced Dalić to move back to the 4-3-3 vs. Scotland. This was Croatia’s best game of the championship, as they managed to exploit Scotland’s midfield three by switching the point of the attack and accessing Nikola Vlašić and Perišić inside the block, which kind of makes England’s performance against the same opponent look worse.
Anyway, Modrić was inspired and led Croatia to a second-place berth and a spot in the Round of 16, where they’ll face Spain. I don’t expect The Checkered Ones to be able to replicate that offense, but they have looked decent enough in their 4-4-2 mid-block (Modrić steps up to join the striker) to be able to grind out an upset if some luck goes their way.
Czech Republic
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-2-3-1
Style: Schick goes brrr
Manager: Jaroslav Šilhavý
Underdogs tend to pin their hopes on one guy and the Czech Republic are no different. Patrick Schick scored all three of his side’s group stage goals — one of which was a gorgeous hit from miles away that I’m sure you’ve all seen by now. I think his class is sort of covering up for the fact that the Czech Republic don’t have a lot going for them. They’ll drop their fullbacks in build-up or create back threes with Tomáš Souček and try to find Vladimír Darida and Patrik Schick between the lines, but it’s all just a bit too slow and telegraphed to truly unsettle defenses.
Šilhavý does have some defensive variation, riding with the orthodox 4-4-2 block before going out to press England man-for-man.
As discussed earlier, it was a bad idea and causes me to wonder how the Czech Republic will handle the Netherlands and bigger sides (if they get that far).
Scotland
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 5-3-2
Style: Battering rams and overlaps
Manager: Steve Clarke
Scotland had one of the clearer identities of the EUROs, defending from a nominal 5-3-2 shape and looking to attack space as fast as possible. Their offensive game plan looked above average once Clarke figured out his best lineup. In addition to Lyndon Dykes’ admirable job as a target man next to Che Adams and ahead of the barstorming John McGinn, the dual-overlapping threat of Andrew Robertson and Kieran Tierney was genuinely hard to deal with, as England experienced.
Regrettably for Clarke, his men, and my online Scottish friends, the Tartan Army peaked vs. Southgate. They were perhaps somewhat unfortunate to lose 2-0 to the Czech Republic but were truly outplayed by Croatia. For all their relative prowess going forward, the organization in midfield and the defensive work-rate of their strikers was lacking.
It’s rare that poor structure against the ball leads to results for smaller teams and Scotland were unable to escape that reality.
Group E
Sweden
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-4-2
Style: Deep block and counter through Isak’s dribbling
Manager: Janne Andersson
There isn’t a more conservative team in this competition than Sweden. Give them the opportunity to be the reactive side and they’ll shell into the most classic “anti-fútbol” 4-4-2 block you’ll see, regardless of whether it completely handicaps their ability to counter-attack as a collective (it does). And here they are, having topped the group and gotten a relatively good matchup against Ukraine. International football, *sigh.*
Though they did play more proactively vs. Slovakia, it arguably made for less fun viewing. Andersson tried to trick us into thinking that he had ideas by having right back Mikael Lustig and left-winger Emil Forsberg come inside, but the total lack of patterns and incapacity to exploit Forsberg as the overload betrayed the emptiness of these structural adaptations.
Alexander Isak has been the sole reason to watch this team and the only source of consistent offense. Folks who’ve been keeping tabs on him since 2019/20 aren’t surprised by his performances in the slightest, but it is a good feeling to see the masses stunned by Isak’s close control, change of pace, and ability to carry an entire transition offense on his shoulders.
Spain
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3
Style: Press and possess
Manager: Luis Enrique
Spain are obviously pretty good and got plenty unlucky in their first two group stage games. They retain and progress the ball as well as anybody and can create chances, but I remain skeptical that Luis Enrique can stay out of his own way. His Marcos Llorente right back experiment seemed to work well vs. Sweden but he messed with the dynamic vs. Poland by playing Gerard Moreno out on the right.
The Koke-Llorente interchanges dissipated as the duo and Moreno alternated holding width — a suboptimal way to use all three, to say the least. As Spain failed to take their opportunities and the second half drew to a close, Enrique made changes that kept the original dynamic intact, failing to see the need for a 1v1 touchline threat like Adama Traoré down the right. Finally, he one-upped the like-for-like trades by bringing on Mikel Oyarzabal for Álvaro Morata, leaving Spain strikerless.
Lucho appeared to be at it again vs. Slovakia, stationing Moreno on the left and sticking César Azpilicueta at right back. It might’ve been stifling against a different opponent, however, Slovakia and their risky defensive structure made it all too easy for Spain. In spite of a missed penalty, Morata was instrumental in offering himself to break lines and La Furia Roja enjoyed playing in spaces that were denied to them in their previous two games.
Spain clearly have what it takes to go all the way, but Enrique needs to do a far better job at reacting to game states if variance goes against his team again, which is not at all out of the question.
Slovakia
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 4-4-2
Style: Risky
Manager: Pavel Hapal
Slovakia were one of the most interesting teams in the tournament purely for their tactical approach. They attacked in a very wide 4-2-4 that encouraged direct play and individual actions from their wingers — the latter of which resulted in a very fun goal.
When playing short, everything revolved around Marek Hamšík, who receded from advanced areas to aid progression.
It ultimately proved to be a low-ceiling offensive style, but what makes the whole thing interesting is their defensive structure: a 5-2-3.
The right winger would recede into a RWB position while Robert Mak joined Ondrej Duda and Hamšik to construct the trio against the ball. This allowed them to go man-to-man vs back threes and block off passing lanes to the center, all while ensuring immediate counter-attacking outlets.
It was a bold strategy that paid off against Poland, who went down a man when they started to get something going in the second half. Nevertheless, the offensive benefits weren’t on display vs. Sweden and Spain ripped the 5-2-3 to shreds. Azpilicueta’s inverted role in possession dragged Mak forward, opening up a hole that enabled Morata to overload the pivot.
Slovakia ultimately might’ve been better served just by engaging in a straightforward transition from 4-2-4-attack to 4-4-2-block, but I’m glad they didn’t, if only because it made them intriguing to analyze.
Poland
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 3-5-2 (2); 3-4-1-2 (1)
Style: Take advantage of the Ballon d’Or winner
Manager: Paulo Sousa
In another timeline, things might’ve gone differently for Poland and they would’ve progressed into the knockout rounds. Conceding a freak own goal to Slovakia and three to the lethargic Swedes doesn’t happen that many times over a thousand simulations, but it perhaps betrays Poland’s inability to make the best of games when they’re in control.
They looked really nice in the second half vs. Slovakia before Grzegorz Krychowiak was sent off, but it took them far too long to exploit the 3v2 overload vs. the double pivot — even though Piotr Zieliński acted more as an attacking midfielder than a strike partner for Robert Lewandowski — and looked too easily thrown off by conceding.
They were more deliberate about using wing combinations to find #10 Zieliński against Sweden in a 3-4-1-2 attacking shape, but couldn’t effectively control counter-attacks in their desperation to rectify going down a goal only two minutes into the affair.
It’s perhaps telling that they looked more dangerous in transition, with Lewa running channels and the wing-backs able to get out into space. They didn’t exactly get loads of those opportunities vs. Spain, but looked more comfortable than most defending in a 5-3-1-1 and countering with the limited opportunities they had.
Group F
France
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: War crimes
Manager: Didier Deschamps
France’s 1-0 win over Germany was the most Deschamps thing ever; Les Bleus conceded 55.1 passes per defensive action vs. Germany (the second lowest this EUROs was Sweden’s 32.25 vs. Spain) and managed only four shots in total. France looked right at home defending in a 4-1-4-1, with Paul Pogba releasing Kylian Mbappé against Mats Hummels.
The context altered dramatically vs. Hungary, forcing France to be the aggressors, and they didn’t look that great. The Karim Benzema-Antoine Griezmann pairing is extremely redundant, with both wanting to receive to feet and move into central areas. Consequently, so much falls on Mbappé’s shoulders to occupy the last line, sprint off-the-shoulder, and destabilize defenses with his movement, passing, and dribbling.
To add to this, France looked amateurish pressing from a 4-4-2 and left massive gaps that Hungary managed to exploit. Deschamps had seen enough by full-time and decided that the sole problem was that he had been too adventurous, returning to his World Cup formula by playing only one winger in a 4-2-3-1 to add more defensive solidity. He also placed Jules Koundé wide right, assembling a back four that was all center-backs (granted, Lucas Hernández does have plenty of reps at left back).
France were more solid than before, but Portugal did score two penalty from some fortunate circumstances, changing the game state and forcing France to react. With Benzema and Griezmann still trying to navigate their way around each other and Corentin Tolisso as the right wing’s only occupant, Pogba’s long balls proved to be the only spark. Eventually, Deschamps brought on Lucas Digne for Hernández (Lucas then got injured and was replaced by Adrien Rabiot, who… just played as a left back) and Kingsley Coman for Tolisso.
France did look better but that marked what was essentially their third look of the tournament in three games. It remains to be seen what Deschamps chooses vs. Switzerland, though the conservative bet would be the safe one.
Germany
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 3-4-3
Style: All offense; no defense
Manager: Joachim Löw
Germany’s 3-4-3 might be the most devastating offense in the competition if Löw wasn’t so insistent on playing Serge Gnabry centrally and Thomas Müller to the side of him. Nevertheless, the gravity of those two and Kai Havertz roaming between the lines is enough to collapse defenses onto themselves, creating a ton of space for wing-backs Joshua Kimmich and Robin Gosens. The former also adds layers to what his side does, being smart and technical enough to step inwards to create midfield threes and attack on the underlap.
This was best seen against Portugal’s back four, where Rúben Semedo was stuck between a rock and a hard place trying to contend with a forward and Gosens with no help from his winger. Gosens rampaged into the box time and time again to lead Germany to a dazzling 4-2 win, but they nearly faltered vs. Hungary.
Even against five defenders, Die Mannschaft still produced plenty of threat, but their midfield of Toni Kroos and İlkay Gündoğan is incredibly soft in defensive transition. When combined with Antonio Rüdiger’s preference to step up aggressively and Hummels’ and Matthias Ginter’ lack of pace, it becomes clear that Germany are the most vulnerable contender in EURO 2020.
Leon Goretzka might add more steel to the midfield and there are still ways to better optimize the attack (Timo Werner and Serge Gnbary on either side of Havertz, perhaps), but I don’t see this fundamental weakness going away.
Portugal
Qualified for the knockouts? Yes
Formation/s: 4-3-3 (2); 4-2-3-1 (1)
Style: More war crimes
Manager: Fernando Santos
Only Deschamps would consider playing a double pivot of Danilo Pereira and William Carvalho vs. Hungary and, even then, Deschamps makes room for Pogba.
At this point, we know exactly who Santos and Portugal will be, irrespective of how much attacking talent they continue to add to their ranks. Settled possession play will circulate through the flanks before turning into crosses to feed the voracious Cristiano Ronaldo, and any opportunity to become the passive actor in a contest will be met with glee.
To be fair, Portugal can be an excellent counter-attacking side thanks to Diogo Jota’s pace and ball carrying, Bernardo Silva’s all-round brilliance, and Ronaldo’s movement, but they genuinely lack good defensive organization for a coach that has such a cautious reputation. Santos made zero adjustments to deal with Germany’s 5v4 overload against his back line and any attempt to press allows someone like Pobga to play through and over Portugal in acres of time and space.
Counting out a team with this level of talent would be ridiculous, but Portugal are definitely the least impressive tactical unit out of any team favored to win the whole thing.
Hungary
Qualified for the knockouts? No
Formation/s: 3-5-2
Style: ~Bielsa-inspired
Manager: Marco Rossi
After seeing Hungary’s ultra-defensive 5-3-2 get chipped away by Portugal in Group F’s first matchday, I thought I was in for another underdog happy to shut up shop and do nothing with the ball. I couldn’t have been more wrong and really should’ve done my research on coach Marco Rossi beforehand.
While it would be a stretch to say that Hungary looked like they were managed by Marcelo Bielsa — principally because they didn’t execute anything resembling a man-to-man high press — they showed off some practiced patterns in possession and came off as a clean ball-progression unit for their status.
Their passing tempo was high and undergirded a desire to quickly hit the middle — whether that be by locating interiors László Kleinheisler and András Schäfer or forwards Roland Sallai and Ádám Szalai — prior to quickly laying it off to wide areas or playing the wing-backs into space. Tons of teams — like Poland — want to pull of these combinations but fail because they can’t execute at the required pace.
Hungary stunned France and Germany with their crisp, smooth passing, gaining a result vs. the former and pushing the latter to the brink. While I’ll never be sad to see Viktor Orbán disappointed, it is a shame that one of most tactically-refined teams of the tournament won’t be playing in the knockout rounds of EURO 2020.