England Are the Ball-Dominant Version of France
Both teams could be so much more, but should they?
Nothing frustrates sports fans more than unfulfilled potential. Your mates will go on and on about how Jesé could’ve been great if only he didn’t suffer an ACL injury; what Derrick Rose’s career would be like if he learned how to land properly; how amazing this France team could be if they played on the front foot.
Wait, what’s that last one? France won a World Cup. What’s the problem?
Well, this was their lineup in the 2018 final:
Blaise Matuidi played as a left-winger solely as a defensive counterweight to Kylian Mbappé’s presence on the right, creating a restricted, lopsided attack that won the biggest prize in world football.
If that seemed “war criminal”-like back then, consider that France have gotten better offensively in 2021, adding the long-banished Karim Benzema to the mix. And, yet, they conceded a scarcely believable 55.1 passes per defensive action vs. Germany (the second lowest this EUROs was Sweden’s 32.25 vs. Spain) and managed only four shots in total.
France played like they had no capability to go toe-to-toe with a team that has arguably less individual talent than they do.
Another win for France; another night of irritation for those who believe that they could be watching magnificent, entertaining displays if only Didier Deschamps had the guts to unleash his weapons.
Unfulfilled potential — it drives us crazy.
England — they also drive us crazy.
And in a very similar way to France.
No, England don’t sit off the ball and live in transitions. It’s the exact opposite, actually. They’re a possession-based side that want to stay in control as much as possible, pressing and counterpressing to complement their short-passing style.
The similarity is in their intent. Just as France defend deep to deny the opposition dangerous spaces and chances, England hold onto the ball in order to prevent their rivals from scoring.
That’s why they operate at snail pace, gradually edging their way into the final third at a very high success rate. They rarely play directly through a block and loathe taking risks to find small passing windows. England are the exact opposite of a team like Italy.
And that fact drove everyone mad as England drew 0-0 against Scotland on Friday.
It certainly wasn’t pleasant watching John Stones, Tyrone Mings, and Declan Rice complete four passes between themselves over the course of a couple minutes, but England were fine offensively for the first half hour.
The first good chance came off of a set-piece, which England seek to maximize in order to make up for any deficiencies in their open play attack, as I discussed here.
The second arose from a good pressing action against McTomisauce.
The third (wrongly called for offside) was more reflective of how England exploited and played around Scotland’s defensive structure:
Manager Steve Clark’s decision to have John McGinn step up onto Declan Rice created a 5-2-1-2 defensive shape that left Billy Gilmour and Callum McGregor on an island any time the two central midfielders shifted over to press fullbacks Reece James and Luke Shaw.
Scotland’s double pivot were vulnerable to smart movements on their blindside by Kalvin Phillips and Mason Mount and could be beat by one-two’s or wing combinations that accessed space back in the interior. The far side CM was generally too late to shift over following a switch and McGinn couldn’t offer cover, having been taken out of the play by his Rice assignment.
A lot of these sequences broke down before manifesting into something dangerous, but they were repeatable actions that exploited a weakness, demonstrating a clear process that could lead to potential danger later on.
However, Scotland adapted. Soon after the offside (supposedly) Kane chance, forwards Che Adams and London Dykes began shifting over to the flank to ease the pressure on Gilmour and and McGregor and allow for a more compact midfield line.
Though it was a clever response, Adams and Dykes looked far from enthused with their new duties and were rather slow to shift from side-to-side. Any sort of quicker tempo from England would’ve enabled them to play around these new obstacles and once again stress Scotland’s ability to move as a unit without coming apart.
Instead, England seemed to get even more deliberate in the second half and Scotland further adjusted by dropping McGinn permanently into the midfield line, happy to concede a 3v2 that posed little threat thanks to Rice’s on-ball weaknesses and England’s desire to circulate in a U-shape.
Consequently, The Three Lions had to be content with slowly inching their way upfield, granting Scotland the ability to constantly reorganize before a ball arrived in the box.
So, why didn’t Gareth Southgate simply get his team to play with greater urgency and risk?
Scotland actually made offensive inroads in the first half. Remember that Sterling dispossession which lead to a Mount shot? That was pretty rare. Scotland either played past England’s press through direct passes into Dykes (won 9 aerial duels) or found territory in behind Shaw and James due to Andrew Roberston’s, Stephen O’Donell’s, and Kieran Tierney’s marauding runs and Dykes and Adams keeping Stones and Mings pinned centrally.
Any dispossession left England in uncomfortable spots for the same reasons and a 30th minute attack saw Scotland nearly take the lead.
As proceedings ground to a halt in the second half, Scotland’s open play threat decreased significantly — but so did England’s.
And therein lies the problem.
England probably created enough to win, racking up enough xG off of 2-3 shots inside thirty minutes (warning: there might be some single-game inflation going on).
That reality could serve as a justification for Southgate’s strategy. His ultra-cautious defensive possession starves opponents of their own offense while doing just enough in open play and via set-pieces to expect one-goal wins.
It’s a highly pragmatic tournament approach akin to France under Deschamps — just with the ball instead of without it.
Having said that, sometimes you concede off of the rare counter-attack and/or your chances won’t end up in the net. In these scenarios — like the one vs. Scotland — England need a way to force the issue in possession when the scoreline holds at 0-0 or 0-1 with the clock winding down.
Doing so requires playing faster, with greater intent to disorder opponents, and an acceptance that this may lead to a little less control.
That doesn’t mean that England are obligated to become a swashbuckling juggernaut, but they do have to start fulfilling some of their offensive potential if football is to come home.