Tactical Preview I: EURO 2022 Quarter-Final Series; England vs. Spain
England have a plan; Spain need a new one.
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This is the first article in a tactical preview series on the EURO 2022 quarter-finals. They will be published chronologically on the morning of each game. I have invited guest writer Yash Thakur to pen the second one: Germany vs. Austria.
Word on the streets is that I might have another special writer lined up for France vs. the Netherlands.
You can return here to find each piece, which will be hyperlinked below when they are published:
Germany vs. Austria [July 21]
Sweden vs. Belgium [July 22]
France vs. the Netherlands [July 23]
England
Formation/s used: 4-3-3
Results: 1-0 W vs. Austria; 8-0 W vs. Norway; 5-0 W vs. N. Ireland
Analysis
The most striking thing about England is how clear their approach is. While other managers have chopped and changed in an effort to find the right balance (we’ll get to that very shortly), Wiegman has used the exact same lineup and nearly identical tactics in every single group stage game.
Although it might look like a 4-2-3-1 on paper, England are deployed in a 4-3-3 on the pitch; Fran Kirby looks to receive between the lines in the left halfspace, while Georgia Stanway influences proceedings as a box-to-box presence on the right. Keira Walsh sits at the base of the trio like a true pivot, stitching the build-up phase together and maintaining a measure of control over tempo.
The nature of the interiors paired with the profile of wingers — Lauren Hemp and Beth Mead — ensures that England often have five attackers placed against the back line, with the possibility of a sixth joining in from fullback or rotating in for an attacker to make a different five. The Lionesses take advantage of these forward numbers through three key ways:
Vertical passes to options between the lines.
Wide combinations that release runners into the channels.
Direct balls in behind.
Despite England’s rather dry performance vs. Austria, the former can’t be characterized as a side that likes to dally on the ball for the sake of control. Instead, they try to exploit available space quickly and attack back lines before they can set.1 This coaxes Wiegman’s personnel into a level of fluidity that can be very hard to track, as Norway found out in the worst implosion of the tournament. Such freedom foments scenarios where Kirby looks more like a #10, as she will roam to the other side of the pitch opportunistically.
The below clip is a great example of how England can transition on the ground, with the profiles of their midfield featuring prominently:
England’s identity against the ball is even clearer. On goal kicks, Mead steps up from the right wing to join Ellen White in a front two. They are supported by Kirby, who marks the pivot, creating a player-to-player approach that is built to stifle the conventional 2-1 build-up structure used in 4-3-3 formations. The catch is that the opposition LB is left nominally free, giving a lot for Lucy Bronze to handle (and for the center-back behind her, as well, should the former Player of the Year get beat).
Wiegman banks on her side being able to recover to the wings quickly enough to render this a non-issue.
In open play, England defend in a very ball-sided 4-4-1-1 in an attempt to congest and trap play on the flank.
This time, it’s the far-side winger — who tries to maintain access to the far-side center-back — that has to split the difference. Nevertheless, the fullback has to be ready to jump out should their attacking partner fail to retreat in time.
Spain
Formation/s used: 4-3-3
Results: 4-1 W vs. Finland; 2-0 L vs. Germany; 1-0 W vs. Denmark
Analysis
In contrast to Wiegman, coach Jorge Vilda has been left scrambling to figure out his best set-up in the absence of the injured Alexia Putellas and Jenni Hermoso. Spain have experienced different configurations in midfield and attack in every group stage game; Vilda has tried defensive midfielders Irene Guerrero and Patri Guijarro as the left-sided interiors in addition to Mariona Caldentey, causing the latter to be moved from the left wing vs. Denmark.
Each arrangement came with its own flaws, constantly altering the Barcelona synergies that Vilda depends on to make Spain a dominant possession unit. However, those connections have still produced excellent moments at times. For all the talk about Spain’s reliance on set-pieces vs. Finland and general lack of an edge, they manufactured some truly brilliant box entries over the course of the last few weeks.
When Aitana Bonmatí and Patri Guijarro get into full flow, they can slice through defenses like few others:
Nevertheless, it’s a problem that a lot of these penalty-area intrusions haven’t turned into attempts on goal (and, when they have, they’ve been missed). To a certain extent, that has been caused by the unavailability of an elite/’true’ nine in the side, which has been further exacerbated by the tactics of La Furia Roja’s opponents. All of Finland, Germany, and Denmark defended deep, with the latter two doing so very well (Finland got shredded). There hasn’t been another side in the tournament that has had to face such stringent, conservative opposition; Denmark suited up in the most defensive formation possible: the 5-4-1 (besides Diego Simeone’s 5-5).
Aitana’s and Patri’s on-the-fly solutions and Mapi León’s elite passing can only take you so far in these situations. It is true that there needs to be further refinement in possession when incorporating figures from other teams, but there simply isn’t a real way around volume crossing when teams start their line of confrontation ten yards outside their own box. Sometimes, you just need a true aerial presence.
Defensively, Spain have predictably encountered most of their troubles in transition. Initially, that had more to do with the absence of any rest-defense structure to aid Mapi Léon and Irene Paredes vs. Finland, which is discussed at great length here:
Since then, Vilda has instructed RB Ona Batlle to form more back-three looks in possession, necessitating the use of a classic winger on the right to maintain width.
Ona is still quite adventurous and, thus, there have been a fair few moments where Mapi and Paredes have been left by themselves, but most of the transition issues vs. Germany and Denmark came as a result of loose passing out of the back and unnecessary risks in deeper situations.
The exception is when Spain chase games, leading to more frantic decision-making and an Ona that is back to being fully committed in attack.
How They Match Up
The Analyst has given England a ~55% chance of progressing, which feels like it’s in the right ballpark.
England’s differential quality on offense and their threat in attacking transitions give them an edge vs. a blunted Spain outfit that has had trouble containing counter-attacks, whether that be down to tactical deficiencies or poor risk management (or simply stupid mistakes).
The home side’s favorite status notwithstanding, there is little reason to think that the contest will be utterly lopsided, as many England fans seem to believe. Variance can always make my claim look stupid, but projecting a likely humiliation based on group stage performances would be a serious misreading of the quality of opponents faced.
England were only seriously tested by Austria — and that was solely in a defensive sense (even then, Austria pressed with their wingers oriented towards the CB’s, conceding the wide areas that England thrive in). England’s other two games were a stroll.
The past we should really focus on is the 0-0 draw between the current quarter-finalists in the Arnold Clark Cup. Even though the lineups were not the same, the manner in which each side handled the other’s tactics might be our best clue as to how this one will play out.
England defended exactly as they always do and Spain struggled to cope.
Spain needed to manipulate Bronze’s defensive role and add more security vs. the press — whether that be with a back three or coordinated movements to attack the left channel (or both) — but Vilda failed to react.
It was a similar story in open play; Spain often found the switch to the far side, but the pass was unsupported by a movement in behind to quickly exploit the advantage. Hence, England were always able to reorganize.
Austria were mildly successful at exploiting England’s scheme in the second half of their group stage battle, leading commentators to wonder why the home team were no longer pressing — they were, their pressure was simply getting bypassed in a way that forced a more conservative reaction. Ultimately, Austria created little from these moments, leaving only a half-written blueprint to copy, if Vilda is so inclined.
I think Wiegman will choose to press again based on the Arnold Clark Cup, what we saw in the initial round, and these words:
England can only “hope” to have the ball if they contest Spain higher up the pitch.
On the flip side, there is absolutely no doubt that Spain will press, and they were successful with it vs. England earlier in the year, forcing Wiegman’s side into fruitless long balls.
That being said, England will be the happier of the two to engage in a dynamic similar to how it’s played out for Spain in their prior three games. If the offensive battle comes down to penetrating a solid defensive structure vs. counter-attacking, Wiegman will bet on her team going through. That puts the onus on Spain to institute alterations rather than England.
The key lies in targeting Bronze and capitalizing on advantages within their brief windows of existence. Spain probably need to do something outside their normal possession plan to put Bronze in uncomfortable positions before quickly moving the ball into sharp movement ahead.
This can happen in any number of ways. Ona can play as a left back like she did in the Arnold Clark Cup, but, this time, as more of an inverted presence who forms back threes out of goal kicks and tries to drag Bronze forward — or into midfield — in open play. If that’s the case, Mariona would have to be dropped from the left-wing due to her own tendencies to roam inside, but it would open up a spot for Athenea or Olga in the front line.
Equally importantly, it would grant Amaiur Sarriegi her best role: an inside forward on the right wing, since Ona’s profile would require a touchline fullback, such as Sheila García, to keep the width. Amaiur could then slip into the channels and use her lethal off-ball movement to get behind the press.
Disregard that system and there is still a place for Amaiur in a way that didn’t exist before. The likelihood of a proactive England means that movement into depth will be vital, and few forwards from the homeland are better at executing that than the Real Sociedad attacker. As the lone nine, Amaiur would be adept at bursting into the channel whenever Bronze is attracted forward. In this context, someone like Olga Carmona (who should be a starter over Leila) could also challenge Bronze by stretching her vertically instead of horizontally2.
The tools for Spain to cause a minor upset are all there — Vilda just has to use them.
Additional reading:
Potential sterility arises when England fail to find a breakthrough using one of the numbered options.
Think fake movements to receive to feet before spinning in behind; Spain’s overloads in build-up would be provided by Ona inverting on the right.
Great stuff. I will watch the game to see how your analysis plays out.