Meet Japan - The Most Tactically Advanced Side in the World Cup
Japan's refined aggression, pragmatic defense, and set-piece creativity create a potent combination that can be matched by no one.
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Japan have taken the 2023 Women’s World Cup by storm, smashing underdogs Zambia and Costa Rica before subjecting Spain to one of the most humiliating defeats any high-caliber side has experienced on the international stage. This has generated considerable excitement over the Nadeshiko’s prospects, with many prophesizing that Japan could repeat their 2011 campaign, where they overcame the mighty United States in the final.
As always, the tiny sample size of tournament play generates a lot of noise that tends to make me cautious of grand proclamations. Zambia and Costa Rica are worlds away from Japan in terms of talent, and the Spain game was pretty even on xG, suggesting that exceptional finishing played its part in the brutal 4-0 scoreline.
Nevertheless, I believe we have seen more than enough to get a solid grasp of the tactics that coach Futoshi Ikeda deploys (the bare bones of process are always visible, especially when the game plans are as distinct as Japan’s).
And what I’ve witnessed is a level of sophistication and versatility that pretty clearly makes Japan this World Cup’s most advanced tactical side.
Allow me to make my case.
Aggression & Directness in Possession — Not “Tiki-Taka”
Let’s get this out of the way: “tiki-taka” is a deeply unhelpful, if not meaningless, phrase. There’s a reason Pep Guardiola hates it. It was originally popularized through a commentator’s onomatopoeic description of short, rapid-fire passing — a trait so common in football matches that it could be used to describe every single team in the world at one point or another. Over time, this vague term has come to be associated with Pep’s Barça, making it an even more unwieldy stylistic adjective. However, if we are to understand “tiki-taka” in that latter sense — meaning an approach predicated on control, patience, and short passing — then it certainly cannot be used to describe Japan in 2023.
The Nadeshiko can and do work beautiful combinations (we’ll get to that soon enough), and their overarching 3-4-3 system is quite proactive (at least vs. lesser opposition), but they prioritize aggression, verticality, and speed at their core. In fact, “simple” long balls to get in behind the defense are arguably Japan’s most fundamental form of progression.
That compilation could honestly be 15 minutes long. And it makes sense why. Japan have the personnel at wide center-back (Moeka Minami (LCB), Rion Ishikawa, Shiori Miyake, and Hana Takahashi (the latter three have all been used at RCB)) to deliver quality from angles and heights that are more favorable than simply lumping it straight down the middle; they can drive forward, reduce the distance of their passes, and face play diagonally, giving themselves options near and far.
Japan’s eagerness to burst away into space was at its most prominent vs. Zambia. But this attitude did not solely manifest through route-one play. Japan went further, utilizing the natural width of it’s back five and the positioning of its inside forwards to create wing mechanics that would reliably stretch and break the Zambian defense.
Observe the clips below. As soon as Japan circulated to their wing-backs, one of the wide forwards (Hinata Miyazawa or Aoba Fujino) would take off in behind.
It was a clear, scripted pattern that had several ramifications. On the one hand, it allowed Japan to take advantage of their wing-back receiving free, as the immediacy of the run provided an outlet into depth before the rival midfield line could recover and apply pressure. This resulted in plenty of quick progressions into the final third. Nothing fancy, yet.
On the other hand, if the opposition was quick to close down or the run was marked, sexier possibilities emerged. The act of reliably covering those yards into the channel produced gravity, sucking players out of position and opening up new avenues to penetrate. A dart forward could free up a central midfielder to receive, suddenly materialize Mina Tanaka as a threat to feet, or gift the wing-back room to initiate themselves.
This is a fine example of how offensive structure and concrete guidelines can actually foster unpredictability. With each player possessing a clear understanding of their strategy to attack the wing, as well as the likely ways it will manipulate the defense, mental processing space is freed up to interpret and act on the contexts that arise, thereby sharpening decision-making.
Japan also had other formulas to fall back on, such as the tried-and-tested third-player run. These actions were largely triggered by the inside forward drifting to the touchline to receive, with the near-side central midfielder situated underneath.
The above sequences reveal the more intricate capabilities of Japan — capabilities that are inextricably tied to and empowered by a deep desire to peel off-the-shoulder.
Take this other set of examples. As Japan circulate and rotate in their tight connections out wide, their central midfielders eventually end up unleashing runs against the last line.
This is what it looks like when technical ability is exploited in service of a ruthless, direct aim.
Altering the Formula vs. Costa Rica
The thing I love about Japan is how willing and able they are to alter their tactics. While they have not yet delivered a slow, controlled performance, I have little doubt that they could. The question is what approach serves Japan the best given the context of who they’re facing.
Zambia defended in a 4-1-4-1 that left ample space behind them without offering much resistance from the lone Barbra Banda up top. Thus, it was logical for Japan to take advantage of unpressured passes from the back to get to goal as quickly as possible.
Costa Rica, meanwhile, organized themselves in a 4-4-1-1/4-4-2 that was significantly more aggressive from the front and, notably, lacked a dedicated screener behind the second line (Zambia had a pivot sitting in between midfield and defense — the second “1” in the 4-1-4-1).
Japan still went straight over the top plenty of times (Costa Rica’s pressing was far from great and their high-ish line was there to be punished), but their wing dynamics changed almost entirely. Instead of the regimented runs into the channels, Japan’s wide attackers preferred to float into pockets and threaten between the lines (as a natural consequence, the wing-backs got up and down the line more often).
That is likely why Ikeda benched Miyazawa, a direct winger, for Hikaru Naomoto, who operates more as an attacking midfielder (incidentally, the stunning 19-year-old Fujino seems equally capable in either role).
Ikeda’s different tactical choices are reflected in the numbers provided by FIFA’s post-match reports. Against Costa Rica, Japan made “movements to receive” in behind at rates 3.7% lower than what they did vs. Zambia. More instructively, Japan offered between the lines 8.3% more frequently vs. Costa Rica than in their Zambian encounter. These differences held (to varying degrees) when filtering by phase of play (build-up, progression, and final third) and thirds of the pitch (defensive, middle, and final).
Japan fashioned these line-breaking opportunities by inviting the press and baiting the midfield into stepping up, which made Naomoto and Fujino prime targets between the lines.
Once in the middle third, these situations became harder to come by, as Costa Rica’s focus switched from forcing turnovers to denying forward progress.
As a result, Japan had to get craftier, either opportunistically hitting brief windows with brave passes or moving the ball in triangles until a gap appeared.
Japan also enjoyed going vertical to Tanaka a lot, with the striker taking advantage of her team’s wing structure and the off-ball gravity of those who flanked her to drop off and receive.
All that being said, it cannot be forgotten that Japan retained a high degree of directness in their approach. While there was certainly a more controlled element to the way they went about things vs. Costa Rica, it was ultimately a modulated version of a system that remained fundamentally aggressive. Hence, why, in addition to the passes over the top mentioned before, Japan enjoyed floating deliveries to their attackers stationed between the lines.
Forcing the issue in this manner naturally assumes some risk. By constantly trying to shatter opposition structures at the earliest opportunity, the chances of losing the ball in dangerous situations increase.
There were a couple of these moments vs. Costa Rica, although they were few and far between — and those that did occur weren’t punished.
So, the question arises: how would Japan’s tactics in possession scale vs. better sides that are more capable of punishing errors derived from belligerent distribution? More specifically, how would Japan deal with the world-class offensive talent of Spain, who were their next opponent in Group C?
Elite Deep Block Defending
Ikeda provided his answer by giving up the ball entirely, instructing Japan to bunker down into a 5-4-1 deep block. Now, this was not a dramatic departure from their defensive tactics in the tournament. Even against Zambia and Costa Rica, Japan didn’t really press, choosing to sit off in a mid-block of the same shape.
But sitting off vs. Zambia and Costa Rica entails a totally different set of consequences than doing so vs. Spain. Against the former two, Japan were still able to operate on the front foot and dictate the nature of the contest. Versus Spain, Japan would expect to be hemmed into their own box, suffering wave after wave of attacks. To make this work, Ikeda’s unit would need to go from being an offensive genius to a defensive one on demand.
And boy did they pull it off.
Japan limited Spain to under 1 xG despite only having 22% possession. This is even more impressive when you realize that Japan spent the majority of the contest 3-0 up, meaning their opponents no longer had any reason to hold back and could go all out (game-state effects frequently skew xG against conservative teams that take an early lead).
Some of this was certainly down to deficiencies in Spain’s own lineup (not starting *ahem* Alba Redondo *ahem*) and game plan, but Japan were largely brilliant in their own right.
Take a gander at the sequence below, which helpfully sums up everything they aimed to execute defensively:
The midfield line was horizontally compact and extraordinarily disciplined. They were concerned, first and foremost, with denying easy passes through the center. In the event that the second line was broken, the responsibility fell on the wide center-backs to step up aggressively and harass the player on the ball, either completing a tackle or forcing the attacker to turn away and restart the sequence.
If Japan succeeded in denying the middle, Spain would be forced wide. As soon as the ball started to travel to one of the fullbacks, Japan’s wingers were away, with the rest of the line not far behind. The intensity and alertness of this reaction cannot be underestimated. If the structure is not reoriented to the wing in time, Spain simply have an easy route around the block, obtaining the space and time to find playmakers with diagonal passes.
Too many outfits make the mistake of believing that defending deep means being passive. On the contrary, teams need to be purposeful in directing the opposition to advantageous areas, where they then have to become extremely intense in an effort to win the ball back. Otherwise, the idea of forcing an attack to a certain area is pointless.
Needless to say, Japan closed down on the wing hard, using the width from their back five and the work-rate of their midfield to congest space and prevent any hope of progression.
These tactics inevitably generated turnovers, which Japan tried to capitalize on by weaponizing their defensive structure. The overall compactness of their shape gave them plenty of short options to quickly fire one-touch passes through their opponent.
I don’t want to exaggerate the success of this. Spain by and large shut this down with their counterpressing. But Japan’s defensive excellence meant that they only needed a few breakthroughs, which did pop up here and there (and which Japan maximized ruthlessly), to create a chance.
Special shoutout to Miyazawa in these clips. Her alertness and response time to the turnover gave her crucial yards on Spain’s defenders and enabled her to win foot races that directly resulted in goals.
The Importance of Using Attackers in Defense
Any analysis of Japan’s open-play tactics is not complete without highlighting Ikeda’s feel for profiles. I already talked about selecting Naomoto over Miyazawa, and it’s also worth mentioning that he possibly benched Tanaka in favor of Ueki vs. Spain due to a slight edge in speed. But undoubtedly the greatest demonstration of Ikeda’s understanding of skillsets — and how they serve the team — has been his decision to wield Jun Endo and Hina Sugita at left-wing back.
While the former is not necessarily a stranger to playing fullback at club level, Angel City fans are more accustomed to enjoying her tricky runs from more advanced positions. Similarly, the latter most often operates as a false winger for the Portland Thorns, drifting inside to act as an attacking midfielder, much like how Naomoto or Fujino might do for the national team.
Both Endo and Sugita would do perfectly fine as the wide forwards for Japan, but there is already a wealth of options in those roles. What barely any team has — especially on the global stage — are fullbacks that can act as significant offensive forces. Fans tend to underrate just how important that can be.
Opposition defensive structures are almost always designed to funnel the ball to the fullback, where the presence of the sideline makes progression tough, and they generally prioritize maintaining local compactness over defending the far side. Thus, the quality of fullbacks in a team can determine the ceiling of a side’s press resistance and their efficacy in the final third.
Relatedly, a huge portion of Japan’s offensive system is predicated on getting the ball to their wide defenders and sparking patterns from there. This makes having gifted attackers — like Endo and Sugita — who are comfortable putting in defensive work a necessity and an incalculable boon. Their ability to dribble, combine, and play gorgeous passes make them lethal stewards of Japan’s wing mechanics.
Furthermore, their comfort in advanced attacking roles grants Japan the potential to pull off fluid interchanges, which elevates the complexity they can throw at opponents.
There is little doubt that Japan’s effectiveness would be appreciably lower without having NWSL-caliber attackers willing to cosplay as defenders.
Inventive Set-Pieces
Japan have left no stone unturned in this World Cup, taking every opportunity to maximize their chances of winning games. Case in point: their set-piece routines.
They’ve tried some neat tricks on corner kicks to varying degrees of success.
They’ve also been slick on free-kicks, with the transition to a third-player action being a particular favorite of mine.
When putting it all together, it’s very difficult to name another team that is as accomplished tactically as Japan. Futoshi Ikeda has inculcated his system with incredibly clear guide posts that both enhance offensive complexity and adaptability. The players’ understanding of the intricacies of their roles and how it relates to wide diamond structures are so keen that it is possible for Ikeda to implement nuanced yet meaningful adjustments overnight.
But the trait that really convinces me is their ability to transition seamlessly from dominating on one night to facing and staving off domination on another. The sheer range of plausible strategic options available to Ikeda is greater than almost any other team.
England are possibly the closest competitor, as they embrace a possession-based approach while being remarkably capable in a number of defensive stances. But they lack the sophistication and clarity of offensive structure that Japan have mastered.
Only time will tell whether this edge will be enough to return the Nadeshiko to the promised land. Tactics aren’t everything — as good as Japan are, they lack the abundance of truly world-class talent present on a number of other contenders. Star power still makes the biggest difference at the end of the day.
But Japan are obviously far from scrubs. They have enough good-to-very-good players to maybe, just maybe, give their elite tactics a chance of bridging the gap to the favorites.
Additional Reading:
World Cup writing worth subscribing to:
Tool a lot from this, will be keeping a special eye on some of what you highlight during the Norway game
Was able to see the video clips ...... Hope to see more articles .......