EURO 2020 Tactical Bites (June 22): Why You Shouldn't Press England; Croatia Exploit Scotland's Midfield
Poor defensive game plans define Group D's final matches.
Welcome to my EURO 2020 matchday column, where I quickly touch on the most interesting schemes, tactical trends, and player performances of the day.
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Czech Republic 0-1 England
England’s lethargic 0-0 draw vs. Scotland generated much criticism of Gareth Southgate and his team. The Three Lions were accused of being unimaginative, slow, and boring. There are merits to being unimaginative, slow, and boring, as I discussed here, but Southgate vowed to provide a greater spark next time out:
We’ve got to produce the football that gives the crowd the excitement they want, the results they want.
England certainly looked better vs. the Czech Republic. The inclusions and influence of Jack Grealish and Bukayo Saka excited fans and led to some neat, flowing football, but I am unconvinced that anything significant changed on a broad strategic level.
While Gareth Southgate restricted Kalvin Phillips’ role more than the last two games and utilized a double pivot, the intended pace of circulation and emphasis on playing primarily through wide areas remained the same.
I say “intended” because any increase in England’s tempo over these group stage games appears to have been induced by the opposition rather than Southgate’s men forcing the issue. Most of these examples occurred vs. the Czech Republic because coach Jaroslav Šilhavý instructed his team to step up onto England’s deep ball players.
It wasn’t always as clean as it looks in the above image, but the intention was to have the entire right side push up so that the Czechs could create a 3v3 against Harry Maguire, Declan Rice, and John Stones. Tomáš Souček would shadow Phillips as Jakub Jankto stuck to Kyle Walker and Tomáš Holeš marked Grealish (the latter duo are both out of frame).
This man-to-man approach and mid-high block left a 3v3 at the back and no extra player to cover the dropping movements of Harry Kane, Sterling, and Saka. The only way to stop England’s attackers from getting on the ball was to deny the pass or have someone from the defensive line completely abandon their position and follow them deep into midfield.
The Czech Republic failed to do the latter for its risk and simply didn’t have the mindset nor energy to do the former, creating an incredibly passive press that allowed England’s back line to calmly find the overload.
This directly led to the goal that decided the game and allowed England to calmly see out proceedings in their usual, languid manner.
Needless to say, pressing England like this is a mistake. If you’re going to do it, it has to be all in, giving skilled passers like Maguire and Stones as little time as possible to see free options further upfield.
Or better yet — don’t press and don’t go man-to-man.
Sitting off and defending zonally puts the onus on England to manufacture solutions through complex movement, interchanges, combination play, and tempo changes — stuff they struggled to do consistently vs. Croatia and Scotland. By stepping up to England’s back six and allowing their attackers to receive and turn, you’re engineering an environment where Southgate’s men can play quickly without having to do anything special.
Croatia 3-1 Scotland
Scotland tried defending England man-to-man (though their pressing was mostly limited to goal kicks) and looked exposed. Steve Clark changed it up mid-game and used his strikers zonally before shifting to a flat midfield line of three that guarded space over any one player.
It proved to be very effective at stifling England, but I did remark that it could’ve been tested had England switched the point of attack decisively and operated at a speed that forced Billy Gilmour, Callum McGregor, and John McGinn to stay on the move.
Though Gilmour was out due to COVID-19 and Stuart Armstrong started instead, Scotland’s strategy vs. Croatia was very much the same: a 5-3-2 block that had the midfield line oriented to the ballside flank.
However, Croatia did a much better job of looking to manipulate the middle three of McGinn-McGregor-Armstrong, rotating play a little more quickly than England and accessing the likes of Nikola Vlašić between the lines.
To be fair, Scotland’s defending was quite poor. The flatness of the line was compounded by a complete lack of awareness of threats on the blindside and it was far too easy for Luka Modrič and Mateo Kovačić to pick their passes.
Without the help of the strikers, rapid switches made it difficult for Scotland to cover the far side without committing a wing-back forward, enabling combinations that could then take advantage of the space that had opened up in behind.
All of this only puts England’s performance vs. Scotland in a poorer light, though one could argue that the individual level and commitment of Clark’s eleven was greater in that game.